Tanzania's experiences of development aid partnerships and environmental mainstreaming have been widely praised in recent years, yet the country continues to suffer from considerable problems of poverty, food insecurity and ecological degradation. As such it constitutes an interesting case study through which to examine hypotheses on global environmental governance. Looking specifically at claims that environmental governance is increasingly 'post-sovereign', this article assesses the degree to which environmental planning and management in Tanzania is becoming 'non-exclusive', 'non-hierarchical', and 'post-territorial'. It argues that evidence for non-exclusivity is plentiful, given the extent of foreign donor, private sector, and civil society penetration of governance processes. Clear hierarchies in environmental governance are hard to discern, but rather than the absence of hierarchy the research suggests the existence of multiple hierarchies produced by both the transnationalisation of environmental politics as well as the complex nature of the Tanzanian state. Finally, rather than a trend towards post-territorialisation, the research suggests that environmental governance should be seen within a longer trajectory of greater state penetration, monitoring, surveillance and intrusion into rural life. It concludes that environmental governance is significantly transforming the Tanzanian state and that, contrary to assumptions that the most important innovations are occurring in the industrialised world, environmental governance is a crucial site of power struggles over the nature of the state in developing countries, in which relationships between the international and the domestic, and state and non-state actors are being recast.
Introduction
Tanzania is often lauded as an outstanding example of a developing country which has mainstreamed environmental considerations into development planning, through successive country-owned and nationally-driven poverty reduction strategy papers and sustainable development strategies, within a broader context of a harmonised and productive relationship with international donors. 1 In 2007 a report by the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) recorded "an ambitious and unprecedented Tanzanian initiative to integrate environmental issues into development policy and practice", which concluded it was "largely very positive" and "offers an iconic and enduring (and perhaps rather rare) example of a nationally-developed policy process which delivers -in practice -what the World Bank's Poverty Reduction Strategy principles describe in theory." 2 Indeed, Tanzania is regarded -at least in the public pronouncements of donor organisations -as a 'model recipient' of development aid, and the economic growth of the past decade, combined with political stability, multiparty democracy, and some progress in tackling corruption, means that Tanzania regularly basks in the warm glow of international approval. According to the IMF, "twenty years of successes have made Tanzania one of the leading reformers in Africa." 3 This warm glow has material consequences: Tanzania receives a disproportionately large volume of development aid, which in 2009 was almost $3bn, the third largest on the continent and representing 6% of the total aid flows to Africa. 4 It is a favoured location for capacity-building programmes and environmental initiatives, and it is beginning to slowly position itself as an emerging player in 'green' finance schemes such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the UN Collaborative Programme on Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD and REDD+). 5 The Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor (SAGCOT), a public-private initiative to develop climate compatible agriculture in Tanzania, was proudly showcased at the 2011 Durban Climate Change conference (COP 17) as a landmark partnership to achieve food security and climate change adaptation. 6 Yet actual environmental and development improvements 'on the ground' are less inspiring.
Tanzania is unlikely to achieve the Millennium Development Goal targets for poverty reduction, food security, maternal mortality or access to potable water. 7 In 2008 33% of the mainland population was still below the basic needs poverty line; 60% of under-5s were underweight or stunted from lack of food; and 43% of the rural population lacked access to potable water. 8 Food security is further threatened by predictions that climatic changes will result in a 33% fall in maize yields nationally, and up to 84% in central regions. 9 This has become a highly charged political issue linked to allegations of 'land-grabbing' by foreign companies for biofuels and agricultural exports, with activists alleging state investmentfriendly policies are "cultivating hunger". 10 This culminated in a government decree in mid-2008 putting biofuel development projects on hold until further guidelines were developed. 11 Furthermore, chronic power shortages over the last 20 years have been blamed on declining hydropower resources in the country's dams resulting from climatic changes to rainfall, although political interference in the policy planning process and high-level corruption are more fundamental causes. 12 Allegations of chronic mismanagement, rent-seeking and pervasive corruption in the forestry, fisheries and wildlife conservation sectors further contribute to substantial doubts over the efficacy of the much-lauded environmental mainstreaming. 13 As such Tanzania represents a fascinating case study of a country seeking to strengthen its planning and management capacities for sustainable development and food security, in the Karkkainen to argue that we are witnessing the emergence of "post-sovereign environmental governance", in which states play a role alongside other actors in governance formations which are non-exclusive, non-hierarchical, and post-territorial. 24 This marks, he argues, a substantial departure from existing conventional assumptions of rational states acting in international anarchy to resolve global commons dilemmas, towards the emergence of "hybrid, polycentric, problem-solving institutional constellations". 25 The rest of this article examines these claims in the Tanzanian context, beginning with a brief historical contextualisation of Tanzanian development and environment policy.
Environment and development politics in Tanzania
The foundations of the colonial state in Tanganyika (as elsewhere in Africa) were intimately bound up with practices of resource management and conservation. 26 On taking over what is now mainland Tanzania in 1891 the German colonial administration established regulations for controlling wildlife utilisation by both Europeans and Africans. 27 Both German and British colonial occupiers established particularly coercive, command-and-control styles of environmental planning and management, as elsewhere in the colonies. 28 However, the symbolic importance of 'wilderness' areas like the Serengeti (the first national park in British colonial Africa), the Selous (known and marketed as 'Africa's last wilderness'), and Mount
Kilimanjaro meant that Tanganyika acquired a particular visibility and prominence within the English speaking world. 29 In many respects this style of statist environmental management was inherited and perpetuated by the independent post-colonial government of Tanzania under President Julius
Nyerere. 30 The importance of agriculture and rural politics to Nyerere's vision of African socialism meant that the management and development of the countryside could not, ultimately, be left to chance. The policy of ujamaa and villagisation represented one of the largest exercises of rural social engineering of the twentieth century, and epitomised the command-and-control style of rural planning. 31 The forced removal and resettlement of perhaps as many as 11 million Tanzanians led to disastrous ecological consequences as well as political and social injustices, and huge food imports were necessary between 1973 and 1975. 32 A recent review of contemporary environmental mainstreaming referred to this history somewhat euphemistically as "Tanzania's famed planning expertise". 33 Independence did not lead to the end of international influence over environmental management and development planning in Tanzania. Even as Nyerere was implementing his form of African socialism and ujamaa, Western donors were eager to fund development and conservation in Tanzania. 34 The increasing influence of major international environmental NGOs -such as the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) -was reflected in their prominence in Tanzanian conservation, and they (alongside expatriate teams of consultants) helped the government to draft major speeches and policies on environment and development issues. 35 Despite
Nyerere's public admission that "I do not want to spend my holidays watching crocodiles", 36 Tanzania quickly became a world-leader in terms of the proportion of its territory with officially protected status, facilitated, funded and often directly managed by international conservation organisations.
This international presence was deepened and extended by the impact of the economic crises of the late 1970s and early 1980s, and Tanzania's eventual transition to liberal democracy and economic neo-liberalism. 37 In the 1980s WWF began to fund government anti-poaching activities in Tanzania, and by the end of the decade they were directly supporting the budgets of the Wildlife and Forestry departments. 38 Tensions over the degree of this foreign involvement and penetration across Tanzanian politics prompted a fall-out between Tanzania and international donors in the mid 1990s, which eventually was resolved when donors agreed to harmonise their activities and allow Tanzanian political elites more autonomy. and Tourism in 1991, and its subsequent move to the Vice President's Office to give it more "political clout" in 1995. 43 The development of the National Environment Policy in 1997 was regarded positively by donors, 44 but the desire to integrate environmental considerations more fully across development policy prompted a DFID and UNDP-sponsored review of the environmental implications of the first PRSP in 2003. 45 In a bid to address concerns including rather narrow public participation and the limited attention given to environmental issues a new PRSP -this time called the National Strategy for Growth and the Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP), or in Swahili, Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umaskini Tanzania (MKUKUTA) -was developed in 2005, aimed at addressing these earlier deficiencies. 46 It was scheduled to run for five years, at which point it was succeeded by MKUKUTA II. 47 A great deal of attention, both national and transnational, was devoted to the environmental mainstreaming of MKUKUTA, which has been held up as an "inspiration to other developing countries, especially in Africa." 48 Reviewers of the environmental mainstreaming process optimistically concluded that "with the environment established as central to the MKUKUTA, Tanzania's development is now following a more secure and sustainable path", whilst admitting there was still a significant "implementation gap". 49 Reflecting the increased prominence of environmental issues in development planning, the official environmental budget has grown significantly and rapidly, from just over 1 billion Tanzanian 56 The mainstreaming of environmental concerns in the MKUKUTA process is an excellent example of this diversity of stakeholders beyond the Tanzanian state. It was achieved with substantial support and assistance from donor and international actors, primarily DFID and UNDP. 57 Although the mainstreaming process was driven by the Vice President's Office, their key Integrating Environment Programme was funded by a diverse range of actors including Danida, DFID, the UNDP Poverty Environment Initiative, the UNEP Poverty Environment Programme, and the Royal Norwegian Government through the UNDP Drylands Development Centre. 58 The MKUKUTA drafting team was chaired by the VPO and included individuals from government and the private sector, CSOs, and academic and research institutions, and it was predominantly Tanzanian, with only three non-Tanzanian residents and (unusually) no foreign consultants. 59 Despite the absence of foreign consultants, the impact of pervasive global discourses of development planning, such as the ubiquitous logical framework approach (or 'log-frame'), are clearly evident. 60 Through a range of participatory and consultative processes many civil society and local organisations also engaged with formulating government policy, and this has been regarded as one of MKUKUTA's biggest institutional innovations and legacies for Tanzanian governance. 61 Such processes have sought to build upon existing attempts to decentralise natural resource management, and involve local village authorities more directly in environmental governance. 62 On the one hand such processes could be seen as the Tanzanian state encouraging the principle of subsidiarity in environmental governance, and thus as evidence for non-exclusive governance, even if we should be cautious about assuming that this necessarily results in increased legitimacy, accountability and transparency. On the other hand, most accounts suggest that these decentralisation efforts have been quite limited in both their scale and effectiveness so far -although different speeds of progress are noted in different policy areas (such as forestry compared to wildlife management). 63 In 2007 Assey et al noted that "participatory forest management still covers only 1% of forest reserves and community wildlife management areas are still only at a pilot stage". 64 The role of the private sector in environmental governance in Tanzania is another significant area of change, and potentially growing non-exclusivity. Despite little direct private sector involvement in the MKUKUTA process, the private sector is increasingly a dominant and driving force in agricultural development, food security, carbon finance and energy supply. 65 Development discourse in Tanzania is becoming even more clearly orientated towards the private sector, and MKUKUTA II declared that though it "builds on its predecessor's strategy, it is oriented more towards growth and enhancement of productivity … and calls for more active private sector participation." 66 The Tanzanian government's Kilimo Kwanza (Agriculture First) strategy is committed to attracting foreign investment, and the 2006 State of the Environment report confirmed that "the government is promoting and encourages participation of private investments in large-scale agriculture." 67 Similarly DFID is promising to "increase its work directly with the private sector", and predicts that 2011-15 will mark a "rebalancing of DFID Tanzania's programme" in this direction. 68 Through this gradual and more intimate inclusion of these key sectors -foreign donors, local populations, and the private sector -environmental governance in Tanzania is increasingly non-exclusive. Harder tests of the degree of post-sovereign environmental governance are the degree to which they are non-hierarchical and post-territorial.
Non-hierarchy and environmental governance in Tanzania
Karkkainen argues that the traditional model of sovereign law-giving states, exercising ultimate authority and jurisdiction over matters within their territory, does not hold in cases of post-sovereign governance. Rather, influence "is wielded primarily through voice and the threat of exit rather than formal voting procedures or hierarchical command structures, although inequalities in expertise and capacities mean that some participants may be more Importantly, this is not to argue that an additional layer of hierarchy exists somewhere 'above' the Tanzanian state. Rather, environmental management consists of extremely complex and convoluted networks of power relationships, overlapping legal conventions, and norms and discourses, which work on and through a myriad of actors, institutions and nodes.
In some cases -such as the overall status of the Serengeti (notwithstanding specific developments within the park) -the Tanzanian state is both constrained and empowered by international law, norms, and conservation organisations; in other cases -such as the requirement to submit national strategies for sustainable development -the Tanzanian state, in conjunction with advisors drawn from the donor and NGO realm, and domestic constituencies, has considerably more latitude and authority to prioritise its own 'development vision' and strategy.
The second complicating aspect of the hierarchical elements of environmental governance in Tanzania is connected to the thorny theoretical and empirical 'problem' of the African state. Ojanen's study of the PRS process in Tanzania concluded that the process led to a select group of locally based NGOs and transnational agencies being invited to "merge in the circle" of the national policy-making elite -in effect to become part of the state itself. 79 Harrison argues that through such processes "the national-international boundary has been rendered so much more porous by a historically embedded 'mutual assimilation' of donor and state power and ideas". 80 There is a further profusion of authorities and actors in terms of the actual implementation of environmental projects 'on-the-ground', including the donor sector, Indeed, this degree of opacity is one way in which the system "works" for those skilled enough to negotiate it, 82 and as Gould and Ojanen note, "the higher echelons of decisionmaking authority are buffered against the direct influence of non-state actors (or 'the poor')
by an ambiguous and multi-staged chain of bureaucratic reporting procedures." 83 Eirik Jansen recounts an anecdotal story circulating in Dar es Salaam involving an accountant who had been hired to go through a government institution's financial management system. When presenting his report and recommendations to the director of one of the departments, the director murmurs in dismay: "But this new system will bring clarity!" Jansen observes that "much creativity and energy have been spent on keeping the financial systems incomprehensible." 84 This complexity of the African state has generated its own body of sociological and political literature: on the neo-patrimonial state, the predatory state, moral economies of corruption, economies of affection, shadow states and shadow economies, and so on. 85 The relevance of these literatures in this case is simply that the orderly, hierarchical state is a doubtful prospect in some areas of natural resource management in Tanzania. The mining sector, for example, has been described as "a matter of loose and rival informal coalitions competing for control of the state apparatus through opportunistic rent-seeking and state plunder". 86 Complex networks of powerful individuals, local and international private companies, political parties and state institutions have contributed to what appears to be endemic and apparently "longterm private sector 'capture'" of the Department of Wildlife in the Ministry of Natural
Resources and Tourism, producing an overall picture of "uncoordinated and collectively dysfunctional rent-seeking" in Tanzania's natural resource sectors. 87 In these sectors rents are channelled through "ad hoc alliances of politicians, officials (including members of the armed forces), and private brokers". 88 In most of these cases the sheer opacity of business relationships and practices prevents easy identifications of clear hierarchies of governance.
The agricultural sector is an excellent example of this complexity. During the 1990s Matthew
Costello noted that the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development was so spatially and organisationally divided that even at the centre "offices are housed in five different locations within Dar es Salaam, some of which cannot be reached by telephone from Ministry Headquarters". 89 Cooksey describes the ambiguous evolution of crop marketing boards:
In theory, marketing boards have been stripped of their former powers as 'crop authorities'. Prior to formal liberalisation in the early 1990s, crop authorities oversaw the production, marketing and export of Tanzania's main export crops. These authorities have been replaced by crop boards with radically reduced mandates. In theory, they are responsible for market regulation, including issuing trading licences to private crop buyers and ensuring competition and quality control, but not for crop financing or marketing. In practice, the picture is much less clear. Crucially, boards continue to be players as well as regulators, and enjoy formal powers over producers and middlemen that far exceed simple regulatory functions. Overall therefore, it is difficult to claim that environmental governance is Tanzania is nonhierarchical, as the Tanzanian state is reluctant to formally cede authority in any area.
However, it is also impossible to assert convincingly that a unified and homogenous Tanzanian consisting of the national and local state, international agencies and NGOs, political parties, and business and private interests. 92 This complex is not confined to the conservation arena, however, but rather encompasses a diverse range of actors straddling all areas of environmental governance.
Post-territoriality and environmental governance in Tanzania
The third dimension of post-sovereign environmental governance that Karkkainen identifies is post-territoriality. This means that environmental governance "is problem-driven, and its spatial and conceptual boundaries are defined not by reference to fixed, territorially delimited agricultural land and fisheries. 95 Further high priority issues include energy security (providing enough energy to meet the needs of a territorially bounded population, although with one eye on the regional market), 96 and urban environmental health (waste, housing, pollution, transport, etc). 97 By and large, these issues are territorially bounded, and focussed on a territorially bounded population. Moreover, this is reinforced by a strongly nationalist discourse in popular and governmental Tanzanian politics, sometimes manifested as a populist suspicion of 'foreigners' or transnational capital, which means that environmental governance is actually firmly orientated towards Tanzanian national priorities and Tanzanian territory. 98 Indeed, the argument can be pushed even further, to the point where environmental planning and management in Tanzania can be seen in terms of a longer dynamic set of power relations between the central state bureaucracy and the rural population. 99 The establishment of conservation and resource management policies under colonialism were an attempt to secure more state control -over valuable resources and territory -beyond the urban and coastal regions. Nyerere's ujamaa sought to extend statist penetration and control over the "uncaptured peasantry". 100 Environmental discourses of land degradation, over-grazing, 106 Local activists' perception of these processes is that "the state, at the central government level in collaboration with centralized appendages at the local governments' level, has continued to exert its statist arms in managing agriculture, albeit, through privatization rather than nationalization." 107 The second example of the intensification of statist control over land and territory, through processes of environmental governance, comes from the monitoring and data analysis dimensions of the MKUKUTA process itself. Much of the focus of MKUKUTA I and II has been on improving capacity for data monitoring, analysis and evaluation. 108 Donors have increasingly targeted their support on improving standards of data collection, analysis and assessment processes, and evaluation and reporting systems. 109 The repeated stress on the very existence of quantitative and measurable targets and indicators -rather than success or failure in meeting them -is evidence of this focus. 110 An official in the MKUKUTA Secretariat claimed that there have been massive improvements in terms of Tanzania's capacity to monitor and evaluate data on the indicators, and there is now a "coherent and harmonised monitoring system". 111 Moreover, the 2011 five year development plan promises that "elaborate mechanisms will be put in place to improve data collection and data flow mechanisms to ensure quality, validity and accuracy of data". 112 This flood of data, arising from surveillance, surveys and monitoring, is driven by and reciprocally fuels the proliferation of reviews, plans, strategies and policies that are required from developing countries like Tanzania. 
Conclusion
Whilst elements of post-sovereign environmental governance can be identified in Tanzania This recrudescence of the state is a very different process, however, to earlier colonial and post-colonial command-and-control statist dynamics. The nature of the state is fundamentally changing, as donors, civil society groups, and private actors in effect become "part of the state itself." 116 Moreover the role of the state itself in environment and development planning and management is changing. The 2009 Poverty and Human Development report stated that "Tanzania's Vision is to achieve a vibrant, developed market economy, which implies that the role of the state is facilitative rather than directive." 117 This shift -sometimes described as moving from 'rowing to steering', 118 is best described in MKUKUTA II:
The private sector has an important and critical role to play in achieving poverty reduction outcomes because of its central role as the engine for economic growth. The government is reducing its role to core functions of policy formulation, economic management, provision of economic and social infrastructure, and legal and regulatory framework, maintenance of law and order as well as selected areas of public-private sector partnership. 119 As such, the Tanzanian state is not the only 'winner' through processes of capacity-building for environmental governance -so too are the international donor agencies, consultants and analysts who fund, support, deliver training, and assess results. So too are those civil society organisations who are willing to be supportive partners, to be 'consulted' and 'empowered' in the proper manner, and to act as a conduit (or replacement) for involving and representing broader local communities. So too are the private sector actors who gain legitimacy and policy influence, as well as access to lucrative natural resources.
Whether such transformations in environmental governance are normatively desirable, and serve the interests of Tanzanian national development and environmental sustainability, is beyond the scope of this article. The assumption in much of the environmental governance literature seems to be that these transformations are a good thing. 120 On the other hand the literature on the transformation of the African state raises many concerns related to the impact on African sovereignty, legitimacy, and accountability. 121 End notes
